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BODIES AND WORLDS ALIVE: 
AN OUTLINE OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN ANTHROPOLOGY
The article begins with a short introduction to phenomenology with an emphasis on the work 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose ideas have had a great impact on cultural anthropology 
since the 1980s, especially through notions like ‘embodiment’ and ‘radical empiricism’. The 
article will proceed to outline main trends in phenomenological anthropology as well as its 
precursors. It then dedicates itself to some of the most prominent issues in anthropology in 
which phenomenology is particularly involved such as:‘bracketing’, ‘betweenness’, ‘mind-
body dualism’ and ‘embodiment’. Alongside a summary of phenomenology’s contribution to 
anthropology, the conclusions will address some of the critiques that are often directed at 
phenomenology. 
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I would like to begin this article* on phenomenology and anthropology 
by immediately posing the most evident question: What can a refl ective and 
introspective science like phenomenology offer to cultural anthropology, a 
fi eld that is by defi nition intersubjective?
Today, the prevailing consensus among cultural anthropologists is that 
knowledge about the ethnographic other is constructed intersubjectively, 
where intersubjectivity is conceived as dialogical, usually textual, 
discourse. Such epistemological ground anthropology reached through the 
history of dialogues between various approaches to cultural experience 
with all claiming or striving for the most comprehensive perspective. What 
phenomenology has to offer to this dialogue on intersubjectivity is an 
* Acknowledgement: This work was supported by a grant from the Croatian Ministry of 
Science, Education and Sports, as a part of the research project: “Population Structure of 
Croatia – Anthropogenetic Approach” (No. 196–1962766–2751 to P. R.).
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 25, str. 19-60, Zagreb, 2013.
Hrvoje Čargonja: Bodies and Worlds Alive: an Outline of Phenomenology in Anthropology
20
impetus to explore it beyond the constraints of language; to venture into 
areas of non-verbal communication and other physcial ways of knowing 
and interaction. The example of mirror or empathic neurons demonstrates 
how scientifi c experiments can objectify ‘irrationality’ if it is accessed 
indirectly1. Considering the fact that phenomenology works on different 
epistemological grounds, phenomenology can offer such an indirect route 
that does not require complex technology but simply observation and 
refl ection on how things appear to the consciousness when we encounter 
them in the world of our bodies and the world of other bodies and objects.
INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline founded by the 
German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Husserl thought of 
phenomenology as a radically different way of doing philosophy. He 
proposed studying whatever appears to the consciousness in the manner in 
which it appears, free from prejudice and preconceived attitudes inculcated 
in tradition or common sense (Moran 2000: 4–5). Phenomenology never 
evolved into a uniform system of ideas. Husserl’s successors like Martin 
Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and others each had their own views on what phenomenology is and how 
it should be practised. However, the appeal to return to, or rather to begin 
with, the lived human experience in all its richness and devoid of distortive 
interpretations imposed by culture, seems to be more or less the common 
ground of all (ibid. 2–3). This is why phenomenology is best understood 
as a method rather than a philosophical system; a method that compels 
one to take into account the way events, things and problems appear to the 
consciousness (of the researcher or the people being researched) and that 
strives to suspend explanation before the phenomena are understood on 
their own terms. Returning to the things themselves as phenomenology’s 
clarion call Merleau-Ponty (1962: ix) clarifi es as follows:
“To return to things themselves is to return to that world which 
precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in 
1 See for example: Gallese et al. 2004; Keysers & Perrett 2004; Preston & de Waal 2002. 
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relation to which every scientifi c schematization is an abstract and 
derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-
side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a 
river is.”  (Merleau-Ponty 1962: ix)
The suspension of ‘natural’ attitudes or assumptions that there is a 
world existing independently of our experience, Husserl named ‘bracketing’ 
or ‘epoche’. Bracketing is likened to the task of a jury which is called upon 
to consider only the evidence,  not assumptions (Moran 2000: 11). Husserl 
claimed that the exercise of such procedure leads one to the attainment 
of a pure presupposition-less consciousness or transcendental ego devoid 
of prejudicial impediments.  Rather than to offer causal explanations, the 
task of the phenomenologist is to document this process of bracketing and 
describe what is apprehended devoid of bias. 
Intentionality or ‘aboutness’ is another characteristic of Husserlian 
phenomenology which states that consciousness is always consciousness of 
something (ibid.: 16). In other words, it means that the act of consciousness 
(noesis) and the object of consciousness (noema) are always intricately 
correlated. This bond, this intentionality, was for Husserl the ground of 
meaning and a way to transcend subject-object dualism (Husserl 1999: 
86–93). Intentionality also led Husserl to realize that consciousness is 
completely engulfed by the environment. Husserl termed this immersion in 
the world ‘lifeworld’, and he saw it as given, prior to any objectifi cation. 
Thus, lifeworld is one of the crucial concepts in Husserl’s phenomenology 
because it represents a direct critique of idealism and rationalism. Namely, 
these philosophical orientations suffer from a ‘view from nowhere’ 
perspective which disregards the fact that all experience happens in 
temporal fl ow, always from a certain perspective and always in relation to 
the surroundings (Husserl 1999: 353–356; Moran 2000: 12–13). Despite 
many opposing factions within the phenomenological movement and its 
numerous critics, it is here that the enduring value of phenomenology lies. 
It represents a continuous critique of naturalistic and positivist streams 
of thought that tend to neglect the irrefutable fact that all knowledge is 
immersed in and arises from lived and very much subjective experience 
(Moran 2000: 21). It continuously draws attention to the fact that objectivity 
is empirically constituted and should not be taken for granted.
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In this connection, it should be pointed out that there are many critiques 
of Husserlian phenomenology. Thus, for example, Martin Heidegger 
criticized it for its lack of historicity, for metaphysical assumptions lurking 
behind the notion of transcendental ego, and for its failure to recognize 
that any description is already an act of interpretation constrained by the 
limitations of language itself (ibid. 20–21). This means that bracketing can 
never be quite conducted to the transcendental end Husserl envisioned. 
The phenomenological account, which is always a form of symbolic 
representation, is always infl uenced by contingencies of time and place. 
Other philosophical schools were also cricital, including analytical 
philosophy that sees phenomenology as introspection and meaningless 
pseudo metaphysics. Marx also disliked phenomenology and saw it as “an 
apotheosis of bourgeois individualism” that disregarded intersubjectivity. 
Although Derrida considered himself a phenomenologist, his theory of 
deconstruction proved how meaning is not generated in the relationship 
between acts and objects of consciousness but in displacement, in differance.
All these positions point to the main presupposition that Husserlian 
phenomenology fails to bracket out because it is based upon it: that meaning 
and being (existence) can be separated and studied independently (Flood 
1999: 99).  This problem becomes particularly evident in phenomenological 
approaches to religion. Meaning in each religious system rests on the 
ontological assumption that Husserlian phenomenology tries to bracket out. 
As Flood (1999: 102) illustrates, phenomenology reaches its limits with 
statements like “To worship Śiva one must become Śiva”. Such śaivite 
utterance fi nds many correspondences across religious traditions. What is 
obvious from this example is that understanding such statements on their own 
terms, by denying the link between ontology and meaning, is impossible. 
We are in the end always left with two choices: either to assume an outsider, 
etic perspective based on ontological assumptions of western academic 
rationalism, or to embrace the insider, emic perspective that, although 
rational within its own cultural couching, becomes problematic when faced 
with western academic rationality. It is important to note here that neither of 
these rationalities constitutes a “value-free discourse” and that there are no 
truly ‘outsider’ views but only competing ‘insider’ ones” (Flood 1999: 104).
Any assumption in line with Husserlian transcendental consciousness 
is potentially theological and indeed very similar to the assumption of the 
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existence of God, Nirvana, or other, in a positivist sense, untenable religious 
‘natural’ attitudes (Cox 2006: 214–215). Husserl’s successors continued 
to deal with this problem of division between meaning and being. While 
hermeneutic strands in phenomenological thought, like that of Gadamer 
(2004) and Ricoeur (1981, 1990), sought to solve this problem in stressing 
dialogue, text and narrative, existentialist thought, particularly that of Sartre 
(1969) and Merleau-Ponty (1962), pointed out the role of the body as the 
ground where meaning and existence coalesce. For Merleau-Ponty, as we 
shall see further on, meaning and being are interconnected on the level 
of experience, which is not necessarily objectifi ed. Apriori knowledge, 
non-verbal and unconscious communication and other non-conceptualized 
bodily ways of knowing comprise a far greater proportion of human daily 
life and experience than narrative and verbal dialogue do (Csordas 1990: 
6). The fact that intersubjectivity is not only discursive is particularly well 
evidenced by recent anthropological studies of interspecies communication 
that is almost completely non-conceptual (e.g. Blackman 2008: 8).
All this is why Heideggerian and existentialist streams of 
phenomenological thought, which stress the situatedness of human 
experience in the world, have been particularly popular with anthropologists. 
The thoughts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the role of the body in human 
perception have been especially infl uential. Consciousness and the world, 
meaning and being, are for Merleau-Ponty so intricately entangled through 
the medium of the body that one cannot talk about the one without talking 
about the other. 
In this regard, Merleau-Ponty’s infl uence is especially noticable in the 
work of anthropologists like Thomas Csordas (1990) who articulated one 
of the most infl uential concepts in anthropological theory of the last decade 
of the 20th century (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 89)  – embodiment2. The 
following section gives a brief overview of some of the crucial concepts of 
the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
2 It is important to notice that apart from Thomas Csordas whose work will be discussed 
later on in this article, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology also greatly infl uenced Michael 
Jackson and Paul Stoller, authors whose works are also considered milestones in 
phenomenological anthropology.
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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed much of his thought against two 
distinct streams of Western rational approaches to human experience and 
subjectivity: intellectualist and empiricist (Hammond et al. 1991: 127–152). 
The fundamental difference between these two theories of knowledge is in 
the ontological status of the world and the subject. For empiricist and realist 
thinkers, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, whereas for 
intellectualist and idealist thinkers, the world is constituted by the knowing, 
transcendental subject. Reliable knowledge for the intellectualist is thus 
attained by reasoning, while for the empiricist it is exclusively gained by 
sense perception. Relying exclusively on sensory experience and denying 
apriori knowledge, the empiricist will give a causal explanation to what 
is perceived. The intellectualist, on the other hand, will take into account 
intuitive processes and try to reconstruct perception by referring to the 
exercise of the subject’s cognitive powers (ibid. 131). Yet, as Merleau-
Ponty notes, both intellectualism and empiricism see the world consisting 
of clearly identifi able objects and in this way suffer from the “‘prejudice’ 
of objective thought” (ibid., original quotations). As Merleau-Ponty states, 
“nothing is more diffi cult to know than precisely what we see” (1962: 51, 
original italics) because objects in the world as lived are often ambiguous 
and indeterminate and never fully specifi able or distinguishable. Merleau-
Ponty’s seminal work “The Phenomenology of Perception” (1962) abounds 
with examples that support his argument, such as: optical illusions, diffi culty 
to distinguish colour and texture, perceiving smaller objects in the distance, 
etc. (Hammond et al. 1991: 183–187). 
Generally speaking, Merleau-Ponty favours the intellectualist 
position because of the empiricists’ complete disregard of subjectivity and 
apriori knowledge, insistence on the determinacy of sensation and their 
assumed constancy between sensation and perception, along with their 
inability to account for the unitary character of perceived objects and human 
freedom (Hammond et al. 1991: 142–144). However, the problem with 
intellectualism, as Merleau-Ponty points out, is its portrayal of perception 
as some kind of judgement in which the absolutely free subject is actively 
involved, whereby determinate objects of the world are known by the subject 
only as appearances  distorted by the workings of the mind (ibid. 186).  In 
this way, intellectualists misrepresent the process of perception and tend to 
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confound it with refl ection and judgement. In opposition to the scientifi c 
or causal explanation of the empiricist and the analytical reconstruction of 
the intellectualist, Merleau-Ponty proposes phenomenological description 
(ibid. 130). 
The advantages of the application of phenomenological description 
are particularly well seen when one tries to account for acquisition of skills, 
or for their application to new settings. Driving a new car with different 
steering controls or playing a new musical instrument does not require as 
much time as it did when we fi rst learnt the skill. The way we accommodate 
our skills to different settings is not by deconstructing each particular 
movement that we have learnt and then reconstructing them anew with 
regard to new circumstance, as intellectualist explanations would have it 
(Hammond et al. 1991: 178–179),. Usually, when driving a new car, we 
just get in and after some initial incongruence in our coordination, often 
followed by feedback from the machine, we adapt quite fast to the harder 
breaks, a bigger car, a smaller seat, the different position and size of the 
steering wheel and so on. What Merleau-Ponty makes clear through similar 
examples is that in order to move our limbs we do not have to fi rst know 
the exact position of them (1962: 97; Moran 2000: 420). As Merleau-Ponty 
clarifi es: “Habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the objective body, 
but in the body as mediator of a world” (1962: 128). In other words, there 
are bodily ways of making meaning, of knowing and of understanding 
the world that do not happen to us in the way objectifi ed and codifi ed 
knowledge does, or in Merleau-Ponty’s words: “My body has its world, 
or understands its world, without having to make use of my ‘symbolic’ or 
‘objectifying function’” (ibid. 124, original quotation marks).
It is here that we come to Merleau-Ponty’s most important contribution 
to the existential-phenomenological project – the rehabilitation of the 
human body. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is “the vehicle of being-in-the-
world” (1962: 71). The body is not just the physical and physiological, it 
is the “living body”, a fi eld of perception and practice (1964: 16),  a nexus 
between the world and self not parsed on subject and object while we are 
‘being-in-the world’. This body has its inward (microscopic) and outward 
(macroscopic) horizons (1962: 271).  The body can be apprehended in the 
form of instantaneous experience “peculiar to itself and complete in itself” 
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 25, str. 19-60, Zagreb, 2013.
Hrvoje Čargonja: Bodies and Worlds Alive: an Outline of Phenomenology in Anthropology
26
but also as generalized experience “in the light of an impersonal being” 
(ibid. 72). The body is also inseparable from the process of perception: 
“Appearances are always enveloped for me in a certain bodily attitude” 
(ibid. 271). This means that we perceive objects always with a certain 
kinaesthetic awareness of our body’s posture and its relationship towards 
its surroundings and circumstances. This is where Merleau-Ponty makes 
evident the error of Kant’s “refl ective action”. Kant’s conclusion: “I am 
consciousness that embraces and constitutes the world” caused him to 
“overlook the phenomenon of the body and that of the thing” (ibid. 272). 
Furthermore, according to Merleau-Ponty, the trap of Cartesian cogito 
was not in a confusion of the transcendental and psychological, as Husserl 
thought, but in the inability to see that the body is the vehicle through which 
“we have the world and the means by which we sustain communications 
with it” (Schmidt 1985: 43). Thus, the world is not a universe of objective 
thought in which the body is seen as an object. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
body is the subject of action in-the-world or “body-subject” (Hammond et 
al. 1991: 151–152). 
As the following excerpt demonstrates, experience, body and world 
are indivisible for Merleau-Ponty on the most basic existential level, and 
stand together as a unity: 
“my experience breaks forth into things and transcends itself in 
them, because it always comes into being within the framework of a 
certain setting in relation to the world which is the defi nition of my 
body…
…perceptual experiences hang together, are mutually motivating and 
implicatory; the perception of the world is simply an expansion of 
my fi eld of presence without any outrunning of the latter’s essential 
structures, and the body remains in it but at no time becomes an 
object in it. The world is an open and indefi nite unity in which I have 
my place…” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 272).
This directedness of consciousness toward the world through the 
medium of the body is what Merleau-Ponty’s understands as ‘intentionality’ 
(Hammond et al. 1991: 179–180). This is in line with the existentialists’ 
understanding of intentionality as “radical interdependence between the 
subject and the world” (ibid. 97). For Husserl, as noted above, intentionality 
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was conceived in quite an intellectualist way, as the relationship between 
acts and objects of consciousness that is the basis of meaning. For 
Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is not a cognitive but rather an incarnate 
and operative concept. Since the primary mode of being-in-the-world is 
practical (ibid. 151), intentionality for Merleau-Ponty does not just hold 
together consciousness and its object. It also brings together action and the 
situatedness of the body in the world.  For Merleau-Ponty, intentionality 
is that which produces the meaningful unity of the world and life. It is 
given, integrated in life. Merleau-Ponty understands it as an “irreducible 
ontological relation with the world” (Moran 2000: 13). In this way, 
meaning as grounded in intentionality is not just derived through cognition 
but primarily through bodily movements and processes, which do not 
necessarily have to be cognized to be meaningful. 
In much of his later work, particularly the unfi nished “The Visible 
and the Invisible” (1968) and in his last published essay “Eye and Mind” 
(2007: 351), Merleau-Ponty continues further to dispense with Husserlian 
transcendental idealism by grounding his theory of incarnate consciousness 
on notions like reversibility, fl esh and écart 3. Merleau-Ponty argues for the 
fundamental dialectic in human embodied existence that always oscillates 
or reverses between two intertwined and interchangeable polarities across 
various sensory modalities: the sentient and the sensible, exemplifi ed by the 
touching and the touched hand or the seeing and the visible body (1968: 136, 
143). In terms of Gestalt psychology, which infl uenced Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought, we could say that reversibility reclines on the inherent ability to 
distinguish between the foreground and the background of our embodiment 
across various sensory modalities, where background is always the vantage 
point of the sensible. In terms of vision, this means that what we see as 
foreground can reverse into background. It means that background to 
whatever it is in the foreground represents a copresent vantage point from 
which our foregrounding is visible. This intertwining or chiasm between 
Hegelian in-itself and for-itself are present in any attempt to grasp things 
as they are (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 137; Schmidt 1985: 92). Reversibility 
stands for the equivocality of the two ways of perceiving, of objectifying 
3 The term is usually translated as ‘gap, displacement’ (Csordas 2004: 171), ‘spread, 
divergence’ (Schmidt 1985: 95), ‘non-coincidence’ (Leder 1990: 89). 
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our being-in-the-world that are refl ected in language as passive and active 
voices. For Merleau-Ponty it is the reversibility between these intertwined 
positions of embodiment that generates sense and meaning (Morris 2010). 
In this way, Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis is also an articulation 
of relativistic ontology based on chiasm. It is ontology that remains 
content with the interrogation of this intertwining, and does not require its 
distortive disentanglement or collapse. Since it strives to take into account 
the indeterminacy that intertwining implies, it curiously reminds one of 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle from quantum physics. Merleau-Ponty’s 
“metaphysics of contingency” (Moran 2000: 430) based on the notion of 
chiasm, assumes continuous and indeterminate reversibility between the 
perceiving and the perceived, or, to make further use of analogies from 
quantum physics, between ‘velocity’ and the ‘mass’. 
Therefore, just as we can never know simultaneously the mass and 
the momentum of the subatomic particle, so we can never become aware of 
the two chiasm’s polarities at once.  Between the sentient and the sensible 
there is always a gap (écart) of non-coincidence (Schmidt 1985: 95). A gap 
that opens up as preobjectifi ed background against which any sensing and 
the sensed emerge as objectifi ed positions. Merleau-Ponty uses the term 
‘fl esh’ for this “fundamental unity permeating all interrelated, interwoven 
things” (Cataldi 1993: 60). Being a term for which Merleau-Ponty fi nds 
no adequate counterpart in traditional philosophy (1968: 139), fl esh is 
understood as an “elementary alterity” (Hass 2008: 31), an undifferentiated 
medium, an “elemental surface of sensibility” (Cataldi 1993: 3, 60–61) 
which encompasses both the depth of our bodies and the horizon of the 
world.  Flesh is “the sensible in a two-fold sense of what one senses and 
what senses”, where “the seer is caught up in what he sees” (ibid.: 139–140). 
From such a standpoint, perception is seen as the folding of the fl esh onto 
itself whereby the fl esh creates thickness in itself (ibid.: 152). This thickness 
is actually the distance that fl esh creates through perception within itself. 
We consequently experience it as a subject-object dichotomy that stretches 
along opposing surfaces of the folded, thickened fl esh (Cataldi 1993: 70; 
Merleau-Ponty 1968: 135). 
Considering the fact that our corporeality is continuous with the fl esh 
of the world which we inescapably share with others on an existential, 
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 25, str. 19-60, Zagreb, 2013.
Hrvoje Čargonja: Bodies and Worlds Alive: an Outline of Phenomenology in Anthropology
29
preobjectifi ed level, reversibility, for Merleau-Ponty, is also the ground for 
intersubjectivity or perhaps better – intercorporeality (1968: 142). Our body 
possesses structural characteristics that enable this equivocation between 
touching and touched, between ‘within’ and ‘without’ (ibid. 134), ‘seeing’ 
and ‘suffering’ (Schmidt 1985: 93). Thus the ‘other’ is only a problem for 
rationalistic approaches, which try to disentangle the obverse and reverse 
modalities of our fl esh. Intersubjectivity is ingrained in the elementary 
structure of the fl esh, or in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “anonymous visibility 
inhabits both of us…in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to 
the fl esh”  (1968: 142).
By continuous insistence to reject cogito as a departing point of 
analysis, and to reveal hidden properties of human embodied existence 
which are fundamentally indeterminate, Merleau-Ponty is one of the 
few thinkers who seriously strived to grapple with both agency and 
structure (Schmidt 1985: 163). In this way, Merleau-Ponty anticipated 
many structuralist and poststructuralist ideas, which is why some authors 
place him between phenomenology and structuralism (Schmidt 1985)4. 
To conclude, for Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is the study of essences 
(1962: vii). However, such study is not conducted from the position of a 
voyeuristic ‘little man behind the eyes’ known as the transcendental cogito 
for whom “for-itself” always “fl ees” from the “in-itself” and vice versa 
(Schmidt 1985: 99). Rather, Merleau-Ponty posits incarnated essences that 
are grasped through consideration of the “facticity” of human existence, 
“for which the world is always already there… as an inalienable presence” 
(1962: vii), where the agency of the body-subject is grounded in the 
indeterminacy of inevitable yet enigmatic reversibility.
PHENOMENOLOGY IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Phenomenological engagement in anthropology can be traced back 
to before anthropologists started more directly applying their readings 
of phenomenological philosophers. Thus, Victor Turner was very much 
4 In a similar vein, John Kultgen (1975) explores congruence between the structuralism 
of Claude Lévi-Strauss and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz.
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infl uenced by the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey whose ideas, together with 
the pragmatist ideas of William James, in many ways informed Husserl’s 
thought. Similarly, Clifford Geertz owes his culture-as-text paradigm 
to Paul Ricoeur, a hermeneutic-phenomenological philosopher of the 
Husserlian tradition. Apart from Turner and Geertz, there were earlier 
anthropologists who developed their own approaches to the psychological 
dimensions of the cultures they were studying. A good example is Irving 
Hallowell (1892–1974), one of the founders of psychological anthropology 
in the tradition of Franz Boas and Edward Sapir (LeVine 2010: 11–13; 
Throop & Murphy 2002: 199).
Hallowell’s notion of the self endowed with perception and behaviour 
(i.e. practice) “in its culturally constituted behavioural environment” 
with “cosmic dimensions and implicit metaphysical principles” (Csordas 
1990: 6; Hallowell 2010: 35, 40) populated with not just natural objects 
but also culturally constituted objects like supernatural beings (Hallowell 
2010: 34–35) were important articulations because they strived to connect 
“perceptual processes with social constraints and cultural meanings” 
(Csordas 1990: 6). Csordas points out how Hallowell’s theory, with its 
stress on perception and practice, bears some resemblance to Merleau-
Ponty’s thought. He explains how similarity is most likely due to the 
infl uences of Gestalt psychology that both Hallowell and Merleau-Ponty 
drew on. Furthermore, Csordas also notes how Hallowell’s notion of 
the behavioural environment as “the context in which the practice is 
carried out” (Csordas 1990: 7) and his attempt to bridge behaviour and 
perception, stand in the line with anthropologists like Marcell Mauss and 
Pierre Bourdieu to whom we owe concepts like “techniques of the body” 
(Mauss 2007) and “habitus” (Bourdieu 1977: 78–87, 1984: 169–170). 
However, as Csordas (1990: 6) notes, Hallowell’s conception of the self 
suffers from the intellectualist malady at which much of Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique was directed. Hallowell’s self is self-awareness, nothing other than 
transcendental cogito. This ‘little man behind the eyes’, although capable 
of grasping itself and becoming directed toward an  objective and culturally 
constructed environment, is not a good model of reality because such a 
model neglects a very simple temporal observation: “while we are capable 
of becoming objects to ourselves, in daily life this seldom occurs” (ibid., 
my italics). Seen through the optics of such a theory, this means that there 
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is a ‘dark matter’ of subjectivity in social reality that makes up a higher 
proportion of our lives than objective and linguistic ones do. Although, 
as Katz and Csordas (2003: 277) point out, Hallowell even used the term 
phenomenology, his clinging to the “objective” cultural experience makes 
Hallowell an advocate of a “protophenomenological” trend in anthropology 
(Csordas 1994a: 6, 1997: 5–6). Along with Irving Hallowell, David Bidney 
(1973) and Lawrence Watson made similar attempts (1976). Robert Levy 
(1973) also deserves to be pointed out because of his seminal contribution to 
the anthropology of the preobjective experience (Throop 2005: 504–508).
Although during the climate of “writing culture” James Clifford 
does not mention phenomenology as an important trend in anthropology 
(Clifford & Marcus 1986), it was the “crisis of representation” (Fischer & 
Marcus 1999) in the anthropology of the 1980s and the 1990s that opened 
up the possibility for phenomenology to address less objectifi ed, but very 
important and inevitable aspects of cultural reality (Katz & Csordas 2003: 
277). Phenomenology was especially invoked by psychologically and 
medically oriented anthropologists. These anthropologists were becoming 
sensitive to the neglect of the body and subjectivity when dealing with less 
rational but inevitable aspects of cultural experience like pain, suffering, 
illness and healing (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 89). Such experiences are 
often portrayed as places of fragmentation, disjunction and discontinuity of 
human experience, diffi cult to objectify, convey and analyze (Kleinman et 
al. 1992: 7; Scarry 1985: 19, 29; Throop 2002: 13–15, 2003: 233–234, 2009: 
541, 2010a: 6)5. In brief, anthropological imports from phenomenology 
consist of focus on the “life as lived” (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 92) in all 
of its indeterminacy and ambiguity; avoidance of excessively theoretical 
or ideological discourse and continuous endeavour to bracket prejudices 
and cultural attitudes; insistence on participation or “radical empiricism” 
(Michael Jackson 1989: 3; James 1912; Stoller 1989: 151); attention to 
“embodied, intersubjective and temporally informed engagements in the 
5 See also: Coakley & Shelemay Kaufman 2007; Csordas 1997; Daniel 1994; Das 2007; 
Desjarlais 1994, 1996; Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good et al. 1994; Jean Jackson 1994a; Arthur 
Kleinman & Joan Kleinman 1996; Arthur Kleinman 1997; Arthur Kleinman et al. 1992, 
1997; Mimica 1996; Scarry 1985; Trnka 2007, 2008.
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world” (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 92). The passages ahead intend to give 
an overview of theoretical trends in anthropology. 
In their recent comprehensive review of phenomenology in 
anthropology, Robert Desjarlais and Jason Throop (2011: 93) have delineated 
four general orientations of phenomenological thought in anthropology, 
not necessarily exclusive of each other: hermeneutic-phenomenological 
approaches, critical phenomenology, existential anthropology and cultural 
phenomenology. Hermeneutic phenomenological approaches6, heralded by 
Clifford Geertz’s “scientifi c phenomenology of culture”, seek to uncover 
“meaningful structure of experience” (1973: 364). They focus on discursive 
forces that govern anthropologists’ “interpretative efforts and intersubjective 
engagements” with the people they study (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 93). 
Critical phenomenological orientations in anthropology7are particularly 
concerned with the phenomenology of power and the historical conditions 
that shape lived experience. As represented by Michael Jackson, 
existential-phenomenological approaches in anthropology8 are marked 
by radical empiricism and focus on the struggle with existential issues 
like the throwness, fi nitude and uncertainties of the lifeworld. Cultural 
phenomenology, developed in the works of Thomas Csordas (1990, 
1993, 1994a, 1997, 1999a, 2002, 2011) and grounded on the concept of 
embodiment, strives to account for both discursive and phenomenological 
aspects of a variety of topics like selfhood, healing, agency, pain, morality, 
music, learning, religion, etc.9
Another epistemological approach in anthropology that has been 
influenced by phenomenology is sensory anthropology (Desjarlais & 
Throop 2011: 90–91; Bagarić 2011). Phenomenology’s tendency to question 
rational dualities, especially that of the mind-body divide, are particularly 
6 Crapanzano 1985, 1992; Desjarlais 2003; Byron Good 1994a; Mattingly 1998.
7 Biehl et al. 2007; Desjarlais 1997; Byron Good 1994a; Scheper-Hughes 1993; Willen 
2007.
8 Michael Jackson 1989, 1998, 2005; Kapferer 1997; Arthur Kleinman 1999; Mimica 
1996; Weiner 2003; Zigon 2008.
9 Downey 2002; Geurts 2002, 2003; Groark 2011; Jean Jackson 1994a; Laderman & 
Roseman 1996; Low 1994; Ots 1990; Pinto 2008; Rabelo & Souza 2003; Straight 2007; 
Throop 2010a, 2010b; Wilson & Csordas 2003.
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pertinent for the anthropology of the body. Sensory anthropology is 
another epistemological orientation very much concerned with varieties 
of perceptual processes and the “patterning of sense experience” across 
and within cultures (Howes 1991a: 3). Although prominent researchers in 
the fi eld such as David Howes and Constance Classen  have inclined to 
more intellectualist, comparative and historical perspectives in exploring 
the senses in society10, there are many sensory-minded anthropologists11 
infl uenced by phenomenology who have recognized the notion of sense as 
a relevant tool for attending to lived experience. 
In anthropological discourse, any “concern with theorizing 
experience” is considered as phenomenological in orientation (Katz & 
Csordas 2003: 277; Throop 2003). Csordas termed such approaches in 
anthropology for which “experiential and phenomenological are in effect 
synonymous” and which do not directly engage with phenomenological 
literature ‘paraphenomenological’ (2003: 277).  Following similar rationale, 
phenomenologically minded anthropologists have often called for stronger 
emphasis on researcher’s engagement in the fi eld, on “radical empiricism” 
(Jackson 1989: 3; Stoller 1989: 151) and “participant sensing” (Pink 2009: 
65). Following the optics of pragmatist philosophers like Dewey (1980) 
and James (1912) who see experience as a “radically empirical domain 
in which thoughts, feelings, and actions are inseparable” (Stoller 1989: 
152–153), radical empiricist is sensitive to the ambiguity of experience in 
all of its throwness, fi nitude and uncertainty (Jackson 1989: 3). This means 
that the researcher “is inclined to judge the value of an idea, not just against 
antecedent experiences or the logical standards of scientifi c inquiry but 
also against the practical, ethical, emotional, and aesthetic demands of life” 
(ibid. 13). In this regard, there are a number of anthropologists who returned 
from fi eldwork with extraordinary experiences that defy Western rational 
explanations and testify to empirical involvement that not many researchers 
would be comfortable with (Favret-Saada 1980; Rosaldo 2007; Stoller & 
Olkes 1987; Young & Goulet 1994).
10 Classen 1993; Classen et al. 1994; Howes 1991b, 2003, 2005.
11 Geurts 2002; Ingold 2000; Pink 2009; Porcello et al. 2010; Seremetakis 1996; Stoller 
1989.
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BRACKETING,  BETWEENNESS AND ALTERITY
One does not have to know about phenomenology to practise it. 
Indeed, none better than the anthropologist knows what it really means 
to exercise bracketing in practice. Faced with the enveloping otherness of 
different culture, every anthropologist very soon realizes how important 
it is to suspend personal prejudices if one is to advance in understanding 
how people make sense out of their lives through discursive practices that 
researchers might fi nd completely irrational or even appalling (Desjarlais & 
Throop 2011: 88–89). Anthropologists are compelled to exercise bracketing 
due to the “betweenness” of their being-in-the-fi eld (Crapanzano 2004: 5,6; 
Desjarlais 2003: 338), because of being “betwixt and between” cultures 
(Stoller 2009: 4; Victor Turner 1991: 95), neither here nor there (Geertz 1988) 
in liminal space maintained by the fl ood of cultural misunderstandings they 
face when trying to participate and observe, live and understand how other 
people make sense of their own experiences (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 89). 
Thus, for example, what stands behind Geertz’s notion of “experience-near 
concepts” (1983: 57–58) is actually a call to understand culture on its own 
terms by learning the “idiom of their minds” (Evans-Pritchard 1976: 19, 
25) and then translating it (Barnard 2004: 160; Evans-Pritchard 1965: 109).
This, as Evans-Pritchard demonstrated, is achieved only by being 
mindful of native rationalities, of local ways of making sense out of 
experience. We have to suspend our rationalizing in order to gain access 
to the natural attitude of the other. Thus  bracketing or Husserlian epoche, 
the touchstone of phenomenological method, is central for anthropological 
methodology as well (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 88–89; Knibbe & 
Versteeg 2008: 49). Following Bidney (1973: 137), Throop discusses the 
notion of “ethnographic epoche” as a crucial element of ethnographic 
encounter that differs from phenomenological epoche “precisely because 
of its participatory and intersubjective underpinnings” (2012: 84; 2010a: 
280–281)12.  
12 It is important to mention another two thematic orientations in anthropology in which 
phenomenological method and epoche also took their roots. These are the anthropology of 
empathy (Briggs 2008; Gieser 2008; Groark 2008; Hollan & Throop 2008; Hollan 2008; 
Kirmayer 2008; Throop 2008a, 2010b) and the anthropology of morality (Geurts 2002; 
Arthur Kleinman 1999, 2006; Mattingly 2010; Throop 2010a; Zigon 2007, 2008).
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Bracketing is something that, after all, everyone has to practise 
to a higher or lesser degree when non-dismissively attending to alterity. 
However, alterity is not just experienced as “encounter with other people(s), 
but as otherness in the sense of cultural difference that is alien, strange, 
uncanny” (Katz & Csordas 2003: 278). Building on Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of reversibility and écart or displacement, Csordas talks about 
“embodied alterity” encountered on the level of the preobjective as the 
background that hovers around and behind everything that we attend to in 
the foreground of our consciousness (2004: 170–172).  Thus for example, 
pain as an occasional or continuous experience always carries along the 
sense of “profound otherness” (Csordas 2004: 166), of “alien presence” 
(Leder 1990: 73) that is “world shattering” (Scarry 1985: 29). Pain resists 
objectifi cation (Scarry 1985: 172; Throop 2009: 541, 2010a: 6) because 
on the most immediate level it relentlessly fails to fulfi l  the horizon of 
expectation and thus disrupts the coherence of our lived experience (Throop 
2003: 234). 
PAIN AND MIND-BODY DUALISM
Among phenomenologically minded anthropologists, it is exactly the 
experience of pain that particularly stands out as a critique of intellectualist 
fallacy known as “ontologisation” of Descartes’ mind and body distinction 
(Csordas 1994b: 7). Pain poses a continuous challenge to Western 
biomedicine and similar approaches that entertain this mind-body divide 
in search for ‘objectivity’ ( Kleinman et al. 1992: 5–6). Anthropological 
engagements with pain13 show that when it comes to phenomena like 
chronic pain, social suffering, somatization, medicalization and similar, 
a human experience is revealed that exceeds the domain of the purely 
subjective. Lingering between the real and unreal (Jackson 1994b, 2011: 
13 Anthropology has a rich body of phenomenological research on pain which is beyond 
the purview of this article. See: Das 2001; Desjarlais 1994, 1997; Garro 1994; Byron Good 
1994a, 1994b; Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good et al. 1994; Jean E. Jackson 2005; Jean Jackson 
1994a, 1994b, 1999, 2011; Jenkins 1994; Arthur Kleinman & Joan Kleinman 1996, 2007; 
Arthur Kleinman 1992, 1997; Arthur Kleinman et al. 1997; Low 1994; Ots 1990; Scarry 
1985; Throop 2008b, 2010a; Trnka 2008.
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383), between the physical and emotional  (Jackson 1994a: 223), pain 
emerges as a very much embodied and intersubjective phenomenon (Good 
1994b; Kleinman et al. 1992: 9), infl uenced (or even caused or alleviated) 
by culture and society. All this makes pain unexplainable by sole reference 
to a positivistic, biomedical conception of “the body as machine”.
It is no wonder then that the fi eld of biomedicine is an especially 
good example of how one profoundly Western and important segment 
of our lifeworld can struggle with its Cartesian legacy, especially when 
it is applied to different cultures (Joralemon 1999: 73; Leslie 2001). 
Biomedicine owes much of its advancement to that moment in the history 
of Western rationalism when the body was freed from the dominance of 
Christian dogmatism and became the place of experiment (Scheper-Hughes 
& Lock 1987: 9). Despite the tremendous and impressive technological 
advancements in biomedicine that have made our lives so much easier, it 
is continuously faced with the problem of dysphoric states of embodiment, 
like pain, that do not necessarily have a physical cause. By focusing only 
on the body, on the physical, the mind is regarded as the place of the 
unreal, which is not quite what Descartes had in mind when he propounded 
his famous cogito (ibid.). This was one of the fi rst critiques that medical 
anthropology offered to biomedicine. It is good in dealing with disease but 
not with illness (ibid. 10). By seeing the body as separate from the self (the 
mind), biomedicine reifi es and fragments the body. Although such disregard 
of the “mindful body” (ibid. 30) has brought us benefi ts than no one can 
deny, the dominance of materialism in the practice of dealing with the not-
altogether-materials like human subjects, especially when they belong to 
different cultures, is unfortunately a fertile ground for the dehumanizing 
treatments and disconcerting forms of body commodifi cation exemplifi ed 
by global organ traffi cking.14 
Even Descartes himself noticed how pain, along with other 
experiences like hunger and thirst, testifi es to the close unity of mind and 
body (Leder 1990: 187 n. 11). However, as Leder points out, body-mind 
dualism is not altogether experientially unfounded. There are “bodily roots 
14 For anthropological research dealing with these issues, see for example: Lock & Nguyen 
2011: 248–251; Scheper-Hughes & Lock 1987: 8–11; Scheper-Hughes 2000: 193–195; 
Sered & Tabory 1999; Sharp 2000: 298, 307.
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of Cartesian dualism” (ibid. 7) that contain “hidden phenomenology” (ibid. 
125). To put it otherwise, any exercise of mind-body dualism is also a form 
of experience and cannot be simply dismissed as incongruent with reality. 
Thus pain, according to Leder, disrupts our intentionality as orientation 
toward the world by causing “spatiotemporal constriction” that tends to 
pull us away from our forward directedness to the here and now (ibid. 
73‒75). To put it in Merleau-Ponty’s words, pain brings our awareness 
from the outward horizon of our being-in-the-world to the visceral depths 
of its inward horizon. It brings our body, or its parts and processes, to our 
consciousness as something foreign to ourselves, as objects that demand 
an “ongoing interpretative quest” (Leder 1990: 78). In this way, pain exerts 
“centripetal force” and “telic demand” upon our being-in-the-world (ibid. 
76‒77).
What is important to notice here, as both Leder and Csordas (1990: 
6) point out, is that the body is “rarely a thematic object of our experience” 
(Leder 1990: 1). The body possesses “self-effacing transitivity” (ibid. 15), 
meaning that it has a tendency to remove itself, to recede or disappear from 
much of our lived experience into the background. To deploy Merleau-
Ponty’s reversibility thesis, our experience of the body shifts between 
the body as an invisible part of the perceiver, and the body as visible and 
perceived. In that sense, pain and illness are experiences in which the écart, 
or non-coincidence, between the two ends of that chiasm is particularly well 
evidenced (ibid. 89). 
To summarize, the problem with mind-body dualism lies not in 
acknowledging this quite experiential distinction, but in making out of it 
mind-over-body metaphysics. From the perspective of such metaphysics 
of presence, the body is seen as some pre-cultural, “raw biological 
material upon which the mind and culture operate” (Csordas 1994a: 8). 
Such an understanding of Descartes’ distinction in the form of positivistic 
objectivism still dominates much of Western academic rationalities, 
including social theory. By failing to acknowledge this irreducible 
ontological indeterminacy between Körper and Leib, between the physical 
and lived body, social theory has neglected the agency of the subject (Leder 
1990: 5). The nomothetics of such an approach has a “natural attitude” 
that tends to see human beings as victims of external forces, as bodies in 
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movements enticed by powers of discourse. This ‘power from nowhere’ 
perspective can thus easily become ‘power from somewhere’, especially if 
such ‘models of’ reality are (ab)used as ‘models for’ reality by hegemonic 
individuals and groups seeking dominance over cultural others (Carrette 
2007: 55–56; Leder 1990: 4). 
Finally, equating soul with intellect in the spirit of materialism 
to which Descartes did not subscribe, Western academic discourse has 
appropriated the mind-body distinction as some sort of apotheosis of human 
cognitive powers. Such a perspective treats the body as res extensa and 
hence fails to see how awareness is more than just thinking. We are, not 
only because we think something, as Descartes would have it, but because 
we can [do] many other things with various degrees of presence, absence 
and thematisation of our bodies (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 121). 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE BODY AND EMBODIMENT
Anthropology’s encounter with the human body has resulted in a 
extensive literature with various theoretical orientations15. The most general 
distinction among body-centred works in anthropology seems to be also a 
chronological one. Anthropologists who have dealt with the body could be 
grouped according to the degree their publications are “revising biological 
essentialism and collapsing conceptual dualities” (Csordas 1999b: 180). 
Namely, earlier anthropological engagements with the body tended to 
see the body as an amorphous biological substrate upon which culture 
inscribes itself. Later approaches, particularly postmodern ones, and those 
under the infl uence of phenomenology, were more inclined to question this 
“natural attitude” of the body proper separated from mind and culture. They 
tended to see the body as the existential ground and site of human agency, 
intentionality and intersubjectivity (Csordas 1999b: 178–179; Farquhar & 
Lock 2007: 4–5; Lock 1993: 134). 
15 A review that would do any justice to this extensive issue is beyond the scope of this 
article and can be found elsewhere; Asad 2000; Csordas 1999b; Farnell 1999; Featherstone 
1995a; Frank 1995; Lock & Farquhar 2007; Lock 1993; Mascia-Lees 2011; Scheper-
Hughes & Lock 1987; Strathern 1996; Turner 1995; Wolputte 2004. 
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Although Marcel Mauss (2007 [1934]) and his concept of “techniques 
of the body” is generally considered as one of the most influential 
milestones in anthropology’s involvement with the body, it was not until the 
1970s, that the body started to emerge as a distinct ethnographic theme. The 
theoretical underpinning for the development of what is often referred to as 
the anthropology of the body was fi rst offered by Mary Douglas (2004) and 
John Blacking (1977).  Following Durkheimian and Freudian paradigms, 
Douglas thought of the body as a “medium of expression” of the social, as 
a “natural symbol” through which human experience achieves cohesion 
(2004: 72, 91). She proposed a division into the physical and social body, 
a dyad very much haunted by Cartesian legacy. In this division, the mind, 
in Durkheimian fashion, is simply substituted by society while the physical 
body is still treated as an “unknowing inert object” (Howes 2003: 30; 
Jackson 1983a: 328–329). On the other hand, John Blacking in his book 
“The Anthropology of the Body”, appears to have been a little ahead of 
his time in rejecting mind-body separation and stressing the importance of 
attending to non-verbal communication (1977: 13–18).
Anthropology of the 1980s and 1990s was particularly marked by 
growing interest in the body. The roots of such interest could be found in 
the postmodern condition in which Western culture and social theory found 
themselves. Chris Shilling thus argues how the centrality of the body for 
the postmodern sense of identity is due to the “privatization of meaning”, 
where the body provides the only “fi rm foundation on which to reconstruct 
a reliable sense of self in the modern world” (2003: 1–2). Similarly, 
anthropologist Emily Martin explains the rising interest in the body with 
historical conditions that caused the “end of the body”, or in other words, 
“fundamental changes in how our bodies are organized and experienced” 
(1992: 121). Especially important in this regard are the technological 
extensions of our bodies that came with modernity. According to Donna 
Haraway, technology has already transformed our bodies into cybernetic or 
cyborg bodies (1991: 149–150). In the near future we may simply not be 
able to do without artifi cial organs or plastic surgery, let alone without our 
laptops and other gadgets. 
After the 1970s, anthropologists exploring the body followed two 
distinct, though not necessarily exclusive orientations: representationalist 
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and phenomenological (Csordas 1999b: 186). Representationalist 
approaches to body16 were very much under the infl uence of the linguistic 
turn in vogue at the time, as well as the works of Michel Foucault (1980, 
1995, 2007) on discursive formations and technologies of power that 
inscribe, control, regulate and discipline the body. The culture-as-text 
paradigm was extremely benefi cial for anthropology. It opened anthropology 
to history and methods of literary criticism, which consequently prompted 
a reflexive critique of ethnography. However, text has unfortunately 
proven to be a “hungry metaphor” threatening to ontologize itself and 
pull anthropological theory into the abyss of particularistic Derridean 
difference (Csordas 1999b: 182).  In such a climate there was a tendency 
to even read the body as text (ibid.). As we have seen in previous sections, 
the notion of experience in these ‘writing culture years’ has become a term 
that “smacks of mystifi cation” because all that the culture-as-text approach 
disclosed was representation, and the question of what representation stands 
for immediately became an essentialist ‘heresy’ (Clifford 1988: 35). As 
Csordas further notes, representation under such a paradigm does not only 
stand for experience but constitutes it (1999b: 183). By collapsing subject 
and object into text, symbolic and later dialogical and refl exive approaches 
in anthropology managed to deal with Cartesian dualism. However, 
they also tended to reduce experience to representation, which made the 
ethnographic gaze insensitive to non-representational aspects of human 
experience, which as was noted above, make up a far bigger proportion 
of human lives. As Jackson succinctly concludes, “the subjugation of the 
bodily to the semantic is empirically untenable” (1989: 122).
Although “the experimental moment in the human sciences” 
(Marcus & Fischer 1999) made many anthropologists realize that the task 
of the ethnographer is to evoke reality, rather than to represent it through 
signifi ers, the refl exive turn that ensued could still not escape the confi nes of 
representational bias (Csordas 1999b: 185). The culture-as-text paradigm, 
just as the language upon which it is based, is only one of the ways of 
being-in-the-world (Csordas 1994a: 11). Rather than to consider language 
as the only way of knowing, as opposite to experience, as something 
16 Comaroff 1985; Featherstone 1995b; Feldman 1991; Lutz 1990; Ong 1988; Pandolfi  
1990; Seremetakis 1991; Suleiman 1986; Synnott 1993; Taussig 2009, 1993.
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 25, str. 19-60, Zagreb, 2013.
Hrvoje Čargonja: Bodies and Worlds Alive: an Outline of Phenomenology in Anthropology
41
that fully refers to or constitutes experience, it seems that one is better 
off thinking about how language, as Heidegger (1996) asserts, discloses 
experience, or that we, as Ricoeur notes, derive meaning from language 
(1981: 141–142). More ‘bottom-up’ approaches were actually needed in the 
anthropology of the body that resonated with Merleau-Ponty’s articulations 
such as being-in-the-world, lived experience, intertwining, and the ‘fl esh’. 
Hence, phenomenological approaches to the body in anthropology17 not 
only considered it to be a theme of research and analysis, but also sought 
to develop a more probabilistic and dynamic theoretical framework that 
strives for a perspective on the body and the world in all of its immediacy 
and “mediacy” (Throop 2003: 233).
This leads us to the one of the most signifi cant contributions that 
phenomenology has to offer to the anthropology of the body – the concept 
of embodiment. In anthropology, several scholars articulated such a non-
dualistic approach to the body and mind, in which the body is not just 
regarded as an object but also as the site of agency18. In this sense, the 
concept of embodiment owes much to Merleau-Ponty’s view of the body 
as the “setting in relation to the world”, as a fi eld of perception and practice 
where macroscopic and microscopic horizons of being-in-the-world 
converge (1962: 271-72). As mentioned in the previous section, Merleau-
Ponty was very keen to consider both agency and structure, making his 
ideas conducive to a combination of phenomenology and hermeneutics 
(Schmidt 1985: 163). Thus for example, both Paul Stoller (1989) and 
Michael Jackson (1989) independently of each other enunciated their 
understanding of embodiment by combining Merleau-Ponty’s ideas with 
Dewey’s “radical empiricism”. On the other hand, Csordas’s own attempt 
was directed in wedding Merleau-Ponty’s existential indeterminacy of 
perception with Bourdieu’s logical indeterminacy of practice (Csordas 
1997: 11–12). In this way, indeterminacy for Csordas, much like in Merleau-
Ponty’s reversibility thesis, became the point of difference but also the point 
17 Csordas 1994a, 1997, 2002; Desjarlais 1994; Jackson 1983a, 1983b; Laderman 1993; 
Low 1994; Ots 1990; Roseman 1991; Scarry 1985; Stoller & Olkes 1987; Strathern 1996; 
Throop 2010a; Turner 1994, 2011.
18 Bourdieu 1977; Devisch 1985a, 1985b; Fernandez 1990; Jackson 1989; Stoller 1989; 
Strathern 1996; Turner 1995.
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of synthesis between the semiotic and the phenomenological. By bringing 
‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘habitus’ together, Csordas laid the groundwork of 
what he calls ‘cultural phenomenology’. The non-dualistic methodological 
orientation of “dialectic structuralism” strives to include both discourse 
and phenomenology, existential and representational meanings, when 
addressing cultural phenomena (Csordas 1990: 12; 1999a: 147). 
Furthermore, Csordas  glosses over the distinction between body and 
embodiment by drawing on the analogy to Barthes’ distinction between 
work and text (1977: 155–164), or rather, as Csordas following Hanks 
(1989) rephrases it, between text and textuality (1994b: 12, 1999a: 145, 
1999b: 181–182, 2011: 137). The body, analogous to work or physical text 
(like the actual book copy) is thus a “biological, material entity” whereas 
textuality, analogous to embodiment, is understood as an “indeterminate 
methodological fi eld defi ned by perceptual experience and by mode of 
presence and engagement in the world” (Csordas 1999a: 145). In the 
words of Merleau-Ponty, embodiment can be understood as a sort of 
intertwining, a chiasm between representation and being-in-the-world 
where “semiotics gives us textuality in order to understand representation 
[and] phenomenology gives us bodiliness in order to understand being-in-
the-world” (ibid. 147).  However, embodiment is also a methodological 
attitude, an attitude that directs the academic gaze to attend to bodiliness 
whether in text or experience, in others or in ourselves. In other words, 
embodiment is a call to attend to the body but also to attend with the body 
as well (ibid. 148–149, my italics).
Previous passages demonstrate how the body as a site for analysis 
was recognized by anthropologists of various theoretical orientations, 
representational and phenomenological alike. What phenomenology has to 
bring to this table is attention to “bodiliness”, which in the words of Terence 
Turner consists of “animal and cultural aspects of the body, and beyond the 
body as a singular object, its relations with other bodies, its processes of 
formation and disintegration, objectifi cation and deobjectifi cation, and the 
construction of subjectivity and of intersubjective relations” (2011: 117). 
This means that no matter what ethnographic approach we feel comfortable 
with – critical, symbolic, refl exive, descriptive, phenomenological or 
nomothetical – we should pay attention to how we as researchers, or the 
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people that we study, attend to their bodies in a more systematic way than 
we did so far. The impetus to do so lies in the postmodern predicament 
that still seems to have a strong infl uence on popular and academic culture 
alike.  Attention to body and bodiliness can, for example, be observed in 
a TV commercial in which a dog starts to bark and growl on hearing the 
sound of his owner’s growling stomach, reminding the owner that it is time 
for a meal supplied by a certain brand of food. Similarly, it is also refl ected 
in anthropological studies that show how today the purpose of exercise is 
not just to improve our looks, but to also to look good while we exercise 
(Bordo 2004: 182).
To recapitulate, in this section I have tried to give a brief overview 
of the role the body has played in the history of anthropological discourse. 
This development could perhaps be traced through three stages: the body 
as unknowing biological substrate, the body as text and/or dialogue, and 
the body as agent. To explain such a disappearance and appearance of the 
body in the humanities we could perhaps turn to Leder’s  notions of the 
absent and present body (1990) discussed in the previous section. From 
such a viewpoint, it seems that the enlightenment, rationality and general 
‘enmindement’ of social science as the inheritor of Cartesian cogito enticed 
the body to recede from the humanities, just as the body recedes when we are 
individually engaged in more “minded” activities like thinking, imagining 
and remembering. In a similar way, postmodern scepticism invoked the 
body to reappear. The removal of fi rm referentials that came about through 
postmodern suspicion of any ontologising metanarratives, together with the 
technological interfaces, extensions, implants and procedures that our body 
are now subjected to, can be seen as certain existential pressures, as a state 
of distress or “crisis of representation” (Marcus & Fischer 1999: 8) that, just 
like illness and pain, cause the “presencing” of the body in our cultural and 
academic attending to the lifeworld (Leder 1990: 22–23).  Understanding 
the body as the existential ground of culture, as something that our studies 
are about and something that we study with, calls for the inclusion of 
indeterminacy, or in other words, the human agency as an undeniable 
existential fact that leaves any theorizing without it always lacking. 
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 25, str. 19-60, Zagreb, 2013.
Hrvoje Čargonja: Bodies and Worlds Alive: an Outline of Phenomenology in Anthropology
44
CONCLUSION
In this last section, I would fi rst like to reiterate some of the main 
contributions of phenomenology to cultural anthropology alongside 
some of the numerous critiques directed at it. In a most general sense, 
phenomenology’s main contribution to cultural anthropology has been to 
offer an expanded defi nition of culture by understanding it as ‘lifeworld’. 
We are thrown into this world with boundaries delineated by our own living 
bodies; by their shape and functions and the limits of our perceptual and other 
cognitive functions, all of which are inextricably linked through patterns that 
extend throughout the world and bodies of other subjectivities. Therefore 
our bodies, objective or preobjective as Kirmayer (1992) notes, insist on 
meaning and are wrought in patterns of various degrees of mutability over 
time and space. These patterns are consistent across our physical bodies, 
bodiliness and embodiment, feelings and sensations, memory, imagination, 
expectations and thoughts and the rest of the world we inhabit. Having this 
in mind, I would like to address one of the most often voiced criticisms of 
phenomenology, namely its alleged solipsism and inability to address the 
social. Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of ‘fl esh’ and reversibility discussed in 
the fi rst section of this article are good examples of how phenomenology 
can think other subjectivities and their interactions. Here I would like to 
point out that contrary to general opinion, the work of Edmund Husserl also 
showed great concern for the intersubjective (Duranti 2010; Zahavi 2003). 
For Husserl, as Zahavi points out, intersubjectivity is part of intentionality, 
which means that the subjective and intersubjective are “complementary 
and mutually interdependent notions” (2003: 118, 123). Duranti further 
explains how, for Husserl, intersubjectivity is “a kind of perspective-
taking that is best characterized with metaphors such as ‘trading places’ 
rather than ‘achieving understanding’” (2010: 14). Husserl made it clear 
that experience of the other is not some kind analogical inference but an 
experience of its own accord that could be phenomenologically analyzed 
(Zahavi 2003: 113). This, as we have seen before is completely in line with 
current neurological understandings of empathy.
Another common criticism that I myself personally relate to, 
especially when I fi rst started reading phenomenological texts, is that 
phenomenological language can be excruciatingly opaque and it takes quite 
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an effort to start thinking in terms of being-in-the-world and other such 
‘dashing’ concepts. However, this kind of aura of impenetrability seems to 
be a feature of all academic disciplines that try to shift thought to different 
ontological grounds, such as quantum physics that is based on the theory 
of relativity. Phenomenological thinking is unfortunately counterintuitive 
precisely because it attempts to describe reality in terms that cut across 
dualities imposed by our ‘natural attitudes’. A frequent consequence of 
this is that some phenomenological observations, like Merleau-Ponty’s 
intertwining, may sound much like pointing out the obvious. Perceptivity 
and perceptability may resemble the discovery of the active and passive 
voice in language. But while this indeed does not sound like much of a 
discovery, it certainly was for the fi rst grammarians. In the same sense, the 
sentient and the sensible as two “quantum” states of our being-in-the-world 
between which we oscillate may well be the basic existential grammar that 
extends from language through the preobjective. Taken as such, Merleau-
Ponty’s reversibility thesis is indeed a profoundly intriguing proposition 
that contributes to probability, indeterminacy and dynamism in theoretical 
conceptualisations that generally tend to be static. 
Evans-Pritchard (1965) conceptualized the main task of cultural 
anthropology as the translation of cultures. While postmodern 
anthropological writings brought the issues of power involved in this 
translation to the surface, the next step in this endeavour was to draw 
attention to the awareness of the body as the site, or methodological fi eld, of 
this translation. What this meant in practice, as many phenomenologically 
inclined anthropologists have demonstrated, was a heightened attention to 
the bodiliness of our informants and ourselves as researchers. The body 
is one of the few human universalities that we can be sure of. Although 
we may never uncover the details of “pre-Babylonian” language, or start 
to use a single world language, we will always have a body as “lingua 
franca”. As Farquhar and Lock have noted, our common carnality makes 
us all “primitives” at the level of embodiment (2007: 14). One can learn a 
foreign language without ever hearing any discourse about it, just by being 
plunged into the living reality of another culture. In this way, the process 
of translation is a process of creating a different kind of dictionary, a 
dictionary that complements our refl exivity, dialogism, ‘thick descriptions’, 
nomothetical endeavours and methodology with refl ections on how other 
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people use and experience their bodies. This in practice means paying closer 
attention to bodiliness in the lifeworlds of the people we study when they 
engage with their environment, with other people, or when they just talk to 
us. However, as many phenomenologically minded anthropologists have 
noted, this also means refl ecting upon our own states of embodiment when 
we engage with our ethnographic ‘others’ or when we are just observing 
them. It is only through practising such sensibility that we can uncover 
regularities that govern a particular domain of our cultural being-in-the-
world as grounded in the body. Consequently, such an endeavour provides 
a more informed account of cultural experience extending beyond the 
constraints of the textual. 
Besides attention to the body and bodiliness there is another sensibility 
that ‘culture as lifeworld’ paradigm brought to anthropology,- the emphasis 
on participation, on apprenticeship and “radical empiricism” (Jackson 
1989: 3; Stoller 1989: 151). Such methodological imperative directs the 
anthropological gaze to the ethnographer’s body as well. It calls for using 
it as an instrument to “sample the experience” of culture. Phenomenology, 
as a practice of bracketing – of suspending natural attitude when faced with 
the alienating otherness of an other culture or “ethnographic epoche” – is 
something that the anthropologist cannot avoid doing, however prejudiced 
she or he is toward phenomenology as a form of Western academic being-
in-the-world (Bidney 1973: 137; Throop 2012: 84). Furthermore, such a 
methodological understanding of phenomenology as the study of what 
‘appears’ interfaces much easier with other non-Western phenomenologies, 
other ways of attending to what appears to consciousness (Halliburton 
2002). 
By developing models of reality based on observation of the ways in 
which people use their bodies provides us with ‘models of’ reality that are 
more informed than ‘models for’ reality. As such, these models produce 
effects that are in concordance with a perspective on social reality as 
embodied negotiation of our existence with issues of power. These models 
do not portray a reality in which people are victimized by power; where 
everything seems untrue and where everything can be deconstructed, 
only to be controlled again. It is understandable how the ‘power from 
nowhere’ favoured by constructivist approaches engenders a hovering 
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controller in a discourse, which is why it is particularly interesting to forms 
of government.  However, applying phenomenology as a methodology 
does not mean replacing but complementing (Desjarlais & Throop 2011; 
Desjarlais 2012). A good analogy here is architectural planning. In order 
to build a paved path across a patch of land so that people do not have 
to walk through mud and grass, an architect will not just apply rules of 
urban planning and architectural design. She or he will also need to have 
an idea of how this patch of land is already used by people and how the 
space will be used in the future. Such observations should play a role in 
designing the best direction of the path. Otherwise, the space may end up 
with many shortcuts across a well-designed walk. We can understand the 
contribution that phenomenology offers to society in general in a similar 
way. Phenomenology argues for the coexistence and cooperation of 
essentialism and relativism, which means that attending to ‘things as they 
appear’ is not necessarily a replacement but always a useful supplement to 
whatever discursive action we take.
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Hrvoje Čargonja
ŽIVA TIJELA I SVJETOVI: 
PREGLED FENOMENOLOGIJE U ANTROPOLOGIJI
Članak započinje kratkim uvodom u fenomenologiju s posebnim fokusom na djelo Maurice 
Merleau-Pontyja čije su ideje imale snažan utjecaj na razvoj kulturne antropologije nakon 
1980-ih, posebice kroz pojmove kao što su otjelovljenje i radikalni empiricizam. Članak 
nastavlja s pregledom glavnih pravaca u fenomenološkoj antropologiji kao i njezinim 
prekursorima. Naredna poglavlja posvećena su istaknutim temama u antropologiji koje 
su povezane s fenomenologijom, kao što su: ograđivanje (bracketing), međubivanje 
(betweeness), dualizam uma i tijela te otjelovljenje (embodiment). Zajedno sa sažetkom 
doprinosa fenomenologije antropologiji, članak završava pregledom nekih od uobičajenih 
kritika upućenih fenomenologiji.
Ključne riječi: fenomenologija, antropologija, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, otjelovljenje, 
dualizam uma i tijela
